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Abstract: In this paper we attempt to enhance process-based integrity argumentation, as used in 
software safety standards, to include a concept of reliability growth. Traditionally, the term reliability 
growth is used to mean the changes in reliability (or some other measure of quality) that occur during 
the debugging process. Here we use it to refer to changes in the quality of the wider software 
development process, as that process proceeds. The reliability growth phenomenon, in this new sense, 
is currently not addressed by software safety standards in any formal way, and its treatment in those 
standards is simplistic. This reliability growth is the result of complex dependencies in the quality 
achieved in different phases of the development lifecycle, and in particular by review processes, the 
effects of which reach across phases. In general, a review has the potential to influence integrity 
assessment for all processes prior to the review, including processes in earlier phases. We attempt to 
formalize this reasoning within a Bayesian Belief Network (BBN) model to encapsulate the deeper 
reasoning underpinning the notion of compliance to software safety standards such as IEC61508-3.  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper brings together two strands of thinking in software reliability. The first strand is reliability 
growth, the observed improvement in dependability that typically occurs in test debug development 
lifecycle, [1,2,3,4]. The second strand is the process based prediction of dependability that is found in 
software safety standards. These standards use assessment of process quality to make software 
reliability claims, hence our use of the term reliability growth, or process reliability growth.  
 
Software safety standards have industry acceptance. There are clear benefits to the process based 
approach they employ because it can be applied early within the development process cf. reliability 
growth testing. However, the reasoning in them is somewhat simplistic. When we attempted to 
formalize this reasoning we realised that insufficient account was being taken of the results of 
reviewing and testing. When we derived a model that could properly assimilate this evidence it 
became apparent that we were modelling a reliability growth phenomenon taking place throughout the 
whole development process [5].   
 
In this paper reliability growth is added to the dependability argumentation used in software safety 
standards. Currently this is not addressed by software safety standards in any formal way. In order to 
illustrate how this could be achieved, the software development process was modelled using Bayesian 
Belief Networks (BBN). Use of Bayesian belief networks to predict software quality is now a well 
developed subject. The earliest work in the area appears to be in the FASGEP project, Hall et. al [6], 
which used BBNs to measure confidence in the software design process. This work included a simple 
model of reliability growth in processes, but although BBNs were used, a bespoke graphical 
probability model was needed to capture reliability growth. In this paper, we propose a more detailed 
model than that in [6], and one that is achieved entirely within the BBN formalism. Fenton and Neil in 
[7] present a critique of existing defect prediction models such as Multivariate models and use of size 
and complexity metrics, and conclude that BBNs offer some attractive benefits compared to the 
existing software metrics techniques.  
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives some background on software reliability growth 
models (RGMs). Section 3 explains our reasons for using BBNs for knowledge representation. Section 
4 introduces the reliability growth phenomenon as an emergent property of the software development 
process. Our conclusions are presented in section 5.   
 
2.  RELIABILITY GROWTH MODELS 
 
Software Reliability Growth Models such as the ones developed by Littlewood, Musa and Abdel-
Ghaly in [1,2,3,4] are well known in the scientific community.  Software reliability growth methods 
use time history of failures obtained during the software test debug phase to estimate important 
product metrics such as the number of initial faults, failure intensity, reliability, number of remaining 
faults, mean time between failures (MTBF) and mean time to failure (MTTF). A significant recent 
development in this field is reported by Bloomfield and Guerra in [8].  The authors applied a reliability 
growth theory named ‘conservative theory’ [9] to a software development process with the aim of 
supporting dependability arguments. They developed a model (the barrier model) in order to estimate 
the software reliability based on the number of errors found in the development lifecycle.  The barrier 
model proposed by Bloomfield and Guerra was calibrated against data obtained from different 
software development projects.  In their paper, the authors highlighted the lack of formalism in 
modelling the set of activities carried out during the software development process as one of the main 
reasons for discrepancies between number of failures predicted by the model and the number of 
failures detected in their case studies.  Sections 3 and 4 of this paper highlight the benefit of using 
BBNs to model the software development process.  
 
 
3.  BAYESIAN BELIEF NETWORKS FOR ARGUMENTS REPRESENTATION 
 
Bayesian belief networks provide a compelling paradigm to framework the set of activities carried out 
in the software development [10,11].  The appeal of BBNs lies in the strong foundations in probability 
theory, and the transparency provided by the graphical formalism. Bayesian Belief networks (BBNs) 
provide a powerful formulation to capture subjective arguments. As a Graphical Probabilistic model, 
BBN provides means for the experts debate the structure of their arguments visually [12].  Experts can 
assess visually which variables influence the domain and also the dependency conditions amongst 
variables. In the software assessment context, a variable may be described by a proposition such as 
‘confidence that the product meets the reliability target’.   A BBN consists of a set of vertices V = {v1, 
v2, …,vn} linked through causal connections.  For such network the following probabilistic model can 
be derived.   
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Where s are the parents of vs.  There is a one to one correspondence between the nodes in the network 
structure and the random variables that form the probabilistic model. In order to illustrate how BBNs 
can be used, consider the following typical example, where it is intended to estimate the ground 
slipperiness(G) given that we may or may not know the state of variables Cloudy(C), Rain (R), 
Sprinkler(S) and Ground Moisture (M).  For simplicity we only consider these five variables and their 
dependency assumptions are captured in Figure 1.   The model is not complete and it has been 
included here solely to show very briefly how BBNs capture undertain reasoning. Specifically: 1)  
What is required in order to build BBNs; 2)  How BBNs provide belief update for any random variable 
presented in the model.  
 Fig1. Bayesian Belief network model for the Ground  
Slipperness model. 
 
Where c stands for the NOT c (not cloudy).  The probabilistic model that corresponds to the  BBN 
structure is as follows: 
 
P(C,S,R,M,G) = P(C)P(S|C)P(R|C)P(M|S,R)P(G|M)      (2) 
 
The belief that the ground is slipperiness can be computed by applying the conditional probability rule. 
 
P(G = g) = P(G=g| M=m)P(M=m) + P(G=g|M=⌐ m)P(M = ⌐ m)     (3) 
 
 
Whilst the likelihoods correspond to the conditional probabilities that are specified in the respective 
network probability table (NPT) the marginal probabilities P(m) and P(~m) = (1 – P(m)) must be 
calculated according to the conditional independence conditions entailed by the structure. Given the 
NPTs, the probability distributions for node S and R will dictate the resulting probability distribution 
for the node M.  
 
Much of the criticism about designing and using BBNs focuses on the definition of the conditional 
probability tables. Probability distributions present in a BBNs’ conditional probability table often 
capture human beliefs or opinions about propositions. Assigning probabilities to events is based on 
expert knowledge; these are sometimes personal judgments that are otherwise unvalidated This 
knowledge may be elicited through either an informal or formal expert judgment elicitation exercise 
[13]. An example of a formal expert judgment elicitation process is presented by Otway and 
Winterfeldt in [16]. Otway’s et al elicitation process consists of seven steps: 1) identification and 
selection of experts; and 2) training in probability judgments; and 3) presentation and discussion of 
uncertain events and quantities;  and 4) analysis and data collection; and 5) Presentation and 
discussion of results of the previous step; and 6) elicitation; and 7) analysis, aggregation, and 
documentation. Keeney and Winterfeldt [14] followed a similar process to elicit expert knowledge 
with regard to the probability of catastrophic failure in two American Nuclear Power Stations namely 
Surry and Sequoyah following the individual or combined failure of two check valves that connect the 
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reactor cooling system and the residual heat removal system [14]. Winterfeldt elicited probabilistic 
values from approximately 40 experts concerning 50 possible events. A similar process was also 
adopted by Cockram in an influential PhD thesis [15].  He elicited probability judgments from 28 
experts in order to populate his BBN NPTs. In addition to eliciting expert’s judgment concerning the 
effectiveness of the software inspection process this work also conducted sensitivity studies on BBN 
models.  One important issue that is often raised in context of expert opinion elicitation is how can one 
combine opinions from multiple experts?  This is a field of research in its own right and publications 
on this topic can be found in the International Journal of Statistics or Knowledge Management, for 
instance.  Methods that are most often applied are the ‘linear opinion pool’ and the ‘logarithmic 
opinion pool’ and significant developments have been made in developing techniques that are 
Bayesian based [16,17].   
 
 
4.  PROCESS BASED SOFTWARE RELIABILITY ARGUMENTS  
 
Safety critical software reliability claims are guided by software safety standards, these standards 
relate a huge range of development choices to a reliability target [18,19]. These arguments are 
complex, opaque and cannot be deterministically modelled.  Process models potentially inject 
transparency into this argument. Identifying a suitable process modelling approach is key. Given that 
the argument is by nature: 1) risk based, so probabilistic; 2) subjective; and 3) involving numerous 
inter-related factors, Graphical Probabilistic Models (GPMs) provide a potential solution, since they 
have the ability to capture all these facets. The following subsections are organized as follows; section 
4.2 presents the network structure that captures the phenomenon of reliability growth in software 
development lifecycle. Section 4.3 addresses issues concerning its implementation in a BBN based 
tool.  
 
4.2.  Argument Structure in a Multi-phased Development lifecycle 
 
The BBN network used to capture the software development process is presented in this section.  The 
network structure was developed based on discussions held with the United Kingdom Health and 
Safety Executive. Interviews with two experts on standards based software assessment followed a 
semi-structured format where causal networks were used to manage discussions and organize the 
interview questions.  In order to model the entire software safety development lifecycle a larger BBN 
is used to combine estimations from individual phases. This larger network feed forwards the quality 
of the development process of each single phase, since the subsequent development work will depend 
on that quality. The network also has feedback connections so that errors found in later phases have an 
impact on the contribution to the estimated SIL in a previous phase. This approach allows us to 
capture intricate influences between ‘phases’ in a way that goes well beyond the reasoning currently 
used in standards. The generic BBN structure shown in Fig. 2 contains a sub-net for each phase of the 
safety software life-cycle (not shown in detail) and a net for interaction among phases. The interaction 
aspect aggregates integrity estimates from multiple phases.  
 
 Fig. 2. Generic BBN Multi-Level structure for several phases of the safety software development lifecycle. 
In each phase of the safety software development life cycle, there are verification exercises that aim to 
find errors introduced in the development process. This verification exercise, or process, certainly 
aims to find errors that are relevant to the particular phase at which it is being applied, but  can clearly 
also find errors made in previous phases of the safety software lifecycle. Errors found in later phases 
are deemed to be corrected resulting in a gain in integrity level achieved at the end of the phase in 
which they were introduced (and hence subsequent phases too). An example is for instance, errors 
found whilst testing the software. Some of these errors will be relevant to the software implementation 
phase, some may have been introduced in the software functional specification phase. 
We implemented a simple rule, that the overall integrity after any phase is the minimum level of 
integrity achieved for all previous phases including its own. For instance, if one claims SIL 1 for phase 
1 and SIL 3 for phase 2, the overall integrity that one can claim after phase 2 is SIL 1. Clearly, this is a 
candidate for debate, and there is a strong case for additive models. 
Bayesian belief network models of the software development lifecycle have also been independently 
proposed by Chin-Feng [10] and Fenton [11] and BBNs to model software development processes are 
gaining popularity in industry. The novelty of the BBN structure present in Figure 2 lies in its detailed 
modelling of reliability growth in software development processes.  
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 4.3. Reliability Growth as an Emergent property in Software Development Processes  
 
The reliability growth phenomenon is graphically illustrated in Figure 2. This phenomenon is made 
explicit in the causal feedback relation from errors found in later phases of the development lifecycle 
to the integrity claim that can be made for earlier phases.  
 
The expert elicitation process of good NPTs is often a lengthy process of consensus building. We do 
not propose that the probabilities used in our model are correct. This notwithstanding it is still possible 
to experiment with the reliability growth phenomenon qualitatively using plausible and coherent 
assumptions are present in the NPTs.  Table 1 depicts a fraction of the BBN conditional probability 
table for node ‘Phase 1 overall integrity’, using only three phases of the software development 
lifecycle are considered for this example. This fraction of the table captures the conditional probability 
distributions assigned for the case where the significance of outstanding errors in phase 1 is deemed 
tolerable. The first column of Table 1 is the significance of outstanding errors in phase 1 of the 
software development lifecycle – software requirements specification phase (A).  In the second 
column of Table 1 is the significance of errors found in the design phase that are relevant to the 
requirement specification phase (B), in the third column in the significance of errors found in the 
system architecture design phase that are relevant to the requirements specification phase(C).  All 
three nodes are given four states in this version of the model, {negligible, tolerable, undesirable, 
intolerable}. Row one in Table 1 captures the probability assignments given to the condition where A 
= tolerable, B = Negligible and C= Negligible. For this particular case the likelihood that SIL 2 can be 
claimed can also be written as P(SIL = SIL2 ¦ A= Tolerable, B= Negligible, C = Negligible) = 0.99.  
The values in Table 1 are used only to illustrate the practical aspect of implementing the model.  The 
model as shown encodes the belief that more weight should be given to the errors found in the phase 2 
of the development lifecycle. Errors found in phase 3 of the development lifecycle are not deemed as 
important as those found in phase 2 however they still have a positive effect on the belief that a target 
SIL can be claimed for phase 1 of the development lifecycle.     
 
Table 1: Node Probability Tables 
 
 
 
 
Phase 1 Overall integrity 
Significance of 
outstanding errors in 
the requirements 
specification phase 
Significance of errors 
found in the system 
design phase 
Significance of errors 
found in the 
architecture design 
phase SIL 1 SIL 2    SIL 3 SIL 4 
Negligible 0.00 0.99 0.01 0.00 
Tolerable 0.00 0.90 0.10 0.00 
Undesirable 0.00 0.80 0.20 0.00 
Negligible 
Intolerable 0.00 0.70 0.30 0.00 
Negligible 0.00 0.80 0.20 0.00 
Tolerable 0.00 0.70 0.30 0.00 
Undesirable 0.00 0.60 0.40 0.00 
Tolerable 
Intolerable 0.00 0.50 0.50 0.00 
Negligible 0.00 0.70 0.30 0.00 
Tolerable 0.00 0.50 0.50 0.00 
Undesirable 0.00 0.40 0.60 0.00 
Undesirable 
Intolerable 0.00 0.30 0.70 0.00 
Negligible 0.00 0.60 0.40 0.00 
Tolerable 0.00 0.40 0.60 0.00 
Undesirable 0.00 0.20 0.80 0.00 
Tolerable 
Intolerable 
Intolerable 0.00 0.10 0.90 0.00 
 5.  CONCLUSION 
 
The proposed Bayesian Belief Network model attempts to capture the phenomenon of reliability 
growth in software development processes.  The need to model this phenomenon emerged from 
interviews with experts when we were attempting to formalize the reasoning underpinning compliance 
to software safety standards.  There is a strong argument for formalizing the underlying reasoning in 
such safety standards using BBNs and indeed BBNs have previously been applied to software safety 
standards by Gran in [20]. However when Gran used BBN to model recommendations made DO-178 
software safety standard Gran did not attempt to model the software development lifecycle in detail.  
Projects where BBNs were used to model the software lifecycle were also briefly discussed (see 
section 4.2) however as highlighted in section 4.2 none of previous attempts to model the software 
lifecycle capture the reliability growth phenomenon presented in this paper.  
 
Our approach could be applied to any product development process.  Whether one is designing a 
hardware or software based system the initial belief in the product quality for a particular phase will 
increase as we correct problems that were found in later phases.  
 
We used a BBNs framework to model the emergent property of reliability growth however it would be 
interesting to see whether process models based on a systems dynamics approach would also enable us 
to quantify this property.    
 
The BBN formalism provides a rich model for argumentation, that can also be imported directly into a 
software tool to support the application of software standards. Tools for implementing BBNs are 
commercially available. Tools such as HUGIN, NETICA, MSBNx, XBaies2, SEAMED, AGENA 
would allow the modeling of the proposed network. 
 
As in any approach, BBNs also have their limitations.  For many the probability assignment exercise 
seems to be their major weakness. However there have been developments in methods to elicit 
probability values from experts and also to aggregate opinions of several experts that aid this exercise. 
It is necessary that that both domain experts and knowledge engineers understand that this exercise 
requires considerable time and effort to prepare questionnaires and also to fill them in.   
Another potential area of weakness for BBNs is that the conditional independence relations in the 
network structure are often unsubstantiated.  
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